



In 1977, the federal government began pur-
chasing crude oil and pumping it into salt domes
in Texas and Louisiana. Since that time, 590 mil-
lion barrels of oil have been pumped into this
"Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
The over-riding objective of the reserve was to
provide a supplemental inventory of crude oil for
those times when disruptions to the oil supply
threatened. Reserve facilities have the capability
to deliver as many as 3.5 million barrels of oil
per day to domestic refineries. Over the years,
the SPR has served several other governmental
objectives, as well. For example, purchases of
additional volumes of Mexican crude oil aided
Mexico during its fiscal crisis in 1982.
The current crisis in Kuwait has raised the issue
of the proper use of the SPR. Changes in the
structure of the oil market, especially the lifting
of oil price controls, have altered the apparent
purpose ofthe SPR. This change in purpose, and
its implications, form the focus of this Letter.
Changing role
The SPR was created in the wake ofthe 1973-74
Arab oil embargo. Gas lines and spot shortages
convinced policymakers that the United States
needed an additional inventory of oil to tap in
the event of future disruptions. At the time the
policy was established, oil prices were regulated.
Although the government had removed wage and
price controls from most commodities by 1975,
nonmarket forces continued to set the price of
oil. Those price controls exacerbated the supply
disruption in 1973-74 (and to some extent in
1979-80) by preventing prices from rising to
balance supply and demand.
With the elimination of price controls on oil in
1981, the SPR lost some of its original purpose.
Since prices could rise to reduce demand when
demand exceeded supply, shortages were less
likely to emerge in reaction to negative supply
shocks. Now that prices provide a decentralized,
efficient mechanism to allocate available sup-
plies, the SPR as originally intended is no longer
essential.
In the current crisis, there is renewed debate
over the central purpose ofthe SPR. Most fre-
quently, the debate centers around whether gov-
ernment should tap the SPR to augment world
supplies and thereby reduce oil prices. This new
role acknowledges that market forces should act
as the primary mechanism for allocating oil dur-
ing "normal" times. However, it implicitly sug-
gests that government has a role in stabilizing
prices during "unusual" events, particularly
in keeping prices from rising too much.
The role of expectations
Current oil prices reflect the market value of
the oil today as well as traders' expectations
about the future value of that oil. If some event,
such as OPEC production cutbacks, accidents,
or demand increases, were to raise expectations
about the future price of oil, the expected future
price of oil would exceed the current price. The
difference would cause traders to withdraw oil
from current consumption and to increase inven-
tories for later sale. The inventory adjustment
would raise current prices and reduce upward
pressure on future prices. Prices would stabilize
when the value of current use equaled the ex-
pected value of storing the oil and selling it in
the future.
When uncertainty about the future is relatively
"normal:' changes in expectations due to some
current event result in a relatively predictable
change in supply or demand in the future. In
such cases, market inventories work to smooth
supplies over time.
In a period of crisis, however, prices may rise
because of heightened uncertainty. Traders' ex-
pectations about future prices rise as traders
incorporate the possibility of large future dis-
ruptions into their assessments. Brokers hedge
against this possibility by holding larger inven-
tories. Large enough additions to inventories
would cause big and rapid increases in current
prices.
Oil prices, therefore, reflect the market's assess-
ment of the expected future value of oil. BothFRBSF
the probability of a disruption and the effect of
a disruption on prices ifthe disruption were to
take place affect the market's evaluation. Should
either factor increase, brokers would increase
inventories, and thereby raise current prices,
even if supply has not physically changed.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, prices rose because
the probability of a disruption to supplies rose
sharply. Prices have risen because of potential
future disruptions, not actual shortages. Increased
production by other OPEC countries has now
offset all of the shortfall from Iraq and Kuwait.
Moreover, inventories at the start of the dis-
ruption were unusually high, and, in the U.S.,
remain above last year's level.
This situation creates an opportunity for using
the SPR to moderate oil prices in two ways. Most
obviously, SPR oil can augment supplies to drive
down prices. Just as importantlY,d clear state-
ment ofwhen events would trigger use ofthe
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to draw oil out of the SPR.
An insurance role for the SPR?
Government inventories, both in the U.S. and
abroad, can act as insurance to oil companies
against potential disruptions. A clear understand-
ing by the market of when and how authorities
would release SPR oil would allow traders to fac-
tor that increased supply into their expectations.
In this way, the availability of the SPR could limit
traders' assessment of the upside risk of future
price increases. Firms may find it less important
for them to hold oil as a hedge against that
possible increase.
The market could even institutionalize this
insurance in the form of options for sale. Traders
could hedge against potential disruptions by
buying options to take SPR oil when prices rise
above the government's price.
For example, the government could offer to sell
an option to buy 1,000 barrels of oil in January at
$50 per barrel. The price that traders would pay
for the option would depend on their assessment
of the likelihood that the market price would ex-
ceed the "strike price" in January. If a disruption
were to occur, and prices rose above $50 per
barrel, the owner of the option would exercise
the option and buy the oil at the $50 price. If the
disiuptionvv'eienot to OCCUi, the tiadei would let
the option expire unexercised.
Selling options on SPR oil tells the market that
the SPR will augment world supplies by a pre-
deterrnined amount in the event of a disruption.
The increased supply, in turn, will put downward
pressure on larger price moves. Knowledge that
such action is forthcoming will reduce uncer-
tainty and cause traders to lower their expecta-
tions about how high oil prices could go.
Whether or not options come about, the insur-
ance role of the SPR depends on a clear under-
standing by the market of when authorities will
sell the oil and at what price. Unless the market
can confidently predict how the SPR will aug-
ment supplies, the SPR will have little effect
on current prices and inventory behavior.
Catastrophic insurance by government?
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the insurance function described. Traders can
hedge against changes in OPEC policy before
OPEC meetings, and they can hedge againstpos-
sible disruptions from fires or oil spills. However,
private inventories are not large enough to offset
potential disruptions that are unusually large and
unforeseeable, such as the current crisis. In those
cases, government may have a role in maintain-
ing an inventory to augment world supplies.
Under what conditions should the government
intervene? Although the current crisis seems like
an obvious candidate for using the SPR, some
have argued for using the reserve to stabilize
prices in more normal circumstances. In this
debate, we need to separate two issues: govern-
ment's role as a supplier of catastrophic insur-
ance, and its role as a price stabilizer. We can
reasonably argue for creating catastrophic insur-
ance, but price stabilization by government is
more problematic.
In catastrophic circumstances, assuming that the
social benefit of the added security is sufficiently
high, it may be in the public's interest for govern-
ment to maintain large oil stocks. The cost of
maintaining stocks large enough to provide insur-
ance against major but temporary supply shocks
may be too high for private agents, given the lowprobability of catastrophic events and the high
cost of storage. Through its ability to tax individ-
uals, the government can pay the cost of main-
taining reserves, whereas a private agent does
not receive compensation for holding stocks
unless those reserves are actually used.
In addition, private insurance markets can allow
individuals to write contracts offsetting economic
harm only by taking money from people unaf-
fected by a negative event to compensate those
that were affected. In the case of a major disrup-
tion to economic activity, wherethe costs are
extremely high and spread over most of the pop-
ulation, a private insurer is unlikely to have the
resources to pay the total cost. Furthermore, the
rates necessary to compensate for the potential
loss probably would be too high to attract cus-
tomers. The use of government oil, in contrast,
not only represents compensation from a pool
of revenue but a possible source of economic
growth. Because oil is a factor of production,
increased sales of government oil would boost
GNP, and partially offset the negative effect on
output caused by the disruption.
Caution with price stabilization
This insurance role for the government only ap-
plies to catastrophic events. Providing insurance
to stabilize prices in more normal times is proba-
bly best left to private markets. Two examples
demonstrate the problems facing more active
government stabilization policies.
Throughout most ofthe post-war period, until
1972, a public agency effectively set oil prices
in the U.s. The Texas Railroad Commission (TRC)
maintained higher-than-market prices for oil by
rationing production in Texas. Refiners told the
TRC how much oil they wanted at the going
price (which remained almost constant). The
TRC calculated the demand for Texas oil after
accounting for imports and non-Texas produc-
tion. Then it told Texas producers the percentage
of their potential production they could produce
to fill the remaining quantity demanded.
The TRC's power to control prices depended
on its ability to maintain an above-market price
and excess capacity in Texas. By 1973, rising
consumption had pushed the market price above
the controlled price, and the TRC could no
longer restrict Texas production. With the loss
of excess capacity, it was no longer able to
regulate the market.
Foreign exchange operations provide another
example of mixed results. When the dollar is
falling "too much," other central banks often
buy dollars to push the dollar back up. When
the dollar is rising "too much;' the u.s. sells
dollars and buys foreign currency to try to drive
the dollar down. Central banks may be able to
"defend" a currency for short periods of time,
but they cannot maintain a level different from
that of the market for very long.
The lessons for the SPR from these two examples
are important. First, to be effective, government
must have sufficient inventories to be able to de-
fend a nonmarket price for some time. Second,
this strategy is only possible when the level de-
fended actually balances supply and demand in
the long term.
Geology imposes a final limitation on a strategy
of frequent intervention. The salt domes into
which we have pumped SPR oil can only be
reused a few times. It is not technically feasible
to pump oil into and out of the SPR on a regular
basis.
Conclusions
In the current crisis, the SPR could be helpful
in calming markets when used as "insurance"
against significant temporary losses of OPEC
production should war break out. A clear state-
ment of the conditions for releasing SPR oil
would reduce traders' assessments of the upside
price risk, and probably lead to less build-up
of inventories.
Over the longer term, there is some justification
for the SPR to serve as insurance against supply
disruptions that result from political crises. But
there is little justification for government to use
the SPR in a policy of regular intervention to
stabilize oil prices in the market. Experience in
other markets suggests that government manip-
ulation of prices works only when the govern-
ment has very large inventories and is aiming for
a target price close to that which would emerge
in a free market.
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